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The presence of Syrian refugees is putting increasing strain on Turkey. Since the migration 
agreement was signed with the EU in March 2016, the number of refugees in Turkey has ris-
en from more than 2.7 million to more than 3.6 million. The growing anti-Syrian sentiment 
among the public poses a threat to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Faced 
with the prospect of a new wave of refugees from the Syrian province of Idlib, Ankara is 
determined and prepared to take radical measures to reduce the danger the migration issue 
presents for the government. 
The most important measure taken is the preparations being made to set up a buffer zone 
in northern Syria. This would serve as a location for returning at least a portion of the Syri-
ans from Turkey, as well as a destination for potential new refugees from Idlib. This will be 
a difficult undertaking, even in view of the White House’s announcement of withdrawal of 
US troops from northern Syria. This makes it even more important for Ankara to seek politi-
cal and financial support in the EU for its actions. If the West does not get on board for the 
buffer zone project or accept requests to revisit current cooperation with regard to migration, 
Turkey might resort to lapses in control of illegal people’s movement, or even stimulate it, 
which could open a new chapter in the migration crisis in Europe.
Migration crisis – the key is in Ankara
Turkey played a central role in the migration cri-
sis, as it had influence over both the manner in 
which it unfolded, and the manner in which it 
was dealt with, and the authorities in Ankara 
were aware of this. The Syrian refugee issue has 
now taken on a different meaning in Turkish 
politics, however. While Turkey may have deft-
ly handled the issue to its advantage in foreign 
policy in 2015–2016, it has now taken on ex-
traordinary importance in view of the domestic 
situation, and consequently affects the position 
of the ruling party. 
Since the civil war in Syria began, Turkey has re-
ceived refugees from the country and organised 
aid for them within its own territory.1 At the 
height of the crisis, in mid-2015, the unchecked 
flow of refugees into the EU gave Ankara lev-
erage with Brussels to gain certain political 
benefits for Turkey in its relations with the EU. 
Under the deal reached in March 2016 between 
Ankara and Brussels, EUR 6 billion in aid was 
to be provided, 3 billion in 2016–2017, and the 
same amount in 2018–2019. A mechanism was 
also put in place for the EU to begin to send 
a number of illegal migrants from the EU to Tur-
key equal to the number of Syrians granted asy-
1 There are currently just over 3.6 million registered Syrian 
refugees in Turkey (of whom less than 10% are in camps). 
The authorities in Ankara say that the aid they have been 
given since 2011 has cost more than USD 35 billion, but 
this figure is hard to verify. S. Sazak, ‘Turkey Can’t Host 
Syrian Refugees Forever‘, Foreign Policy, 27.08.2019. 
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lum and sent from Turkey to the EU. This was in-
tended to stop people attempting to get from 
Turkey to the EU by themselves, and thus curb 
human trafficking via the Aegean Sea. In ad-
dition, Turkey made a commitment to tighten 
up border service and coastguard control over 
its own coastline. In return, in addition to the 
agreed financial aid, one of the undertakings 
made by Brussels was to open one of the chap-
ters in accession talks for Turkey, and to speed 
up the easing of visa requirements for Turkish 
citizens travelling in the EU.2
Turkey implemented the adopted solutions, 
and, when these were combined with measures 
taken by other countries, such as the stopping 
of large-scale flow of immigrants through the 
Balkans, the effects were almost instantane-
ous. In June 2016, the number of refugees en-
tering the EU fell by more than 95%.3 The pro-
gress achieved due to the agreement with the 
EU, and the manageable scale of human move-
ment, which continues today, demonstrate that 
in recent years Turkey has had both the oppor-
tunity and the means necessary to make a con-
siderable contribution to overcoming the crisis. 
Turkey continued these measures despite no 
progress being made in the accession talks4 or 
regarding the prestigious issue for Turkey of re-
laxation of visa requirements, and also despite 
miscommunication regarding the timeframe 
2 EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. 
3 Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and 
Answers, Brussels, 15.06.2016. 
4 In this case, there was a gradual ebbing in motivation on 
both sides, and the accession process has de facto been 
suspended without any prospect of this changing.
and procedure in which the agreed financial 
aid would be disbursed.5 This was accompanied 
by occasional increases in tension and rhetor-
ical disputes – in particular accusations made 
by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against the 
West of hypocrisy and having no regard for 
harms done to Muslim communities. All of this 
severely undermined the atmosphere in the 
bilateral relations. Nevertheless, from Turkey’s 
standpoint, the mere easing of the financial 
burden due to cooperating with the EU yield-
ed benefits. This can be seen by the tempering 
of the rhetoric relating to the expected rapid 
progress in realisation of the EU’s commitments 
towards Turkey as discussed above. 
More than three and a half years after the 
agreement with the EU was signed, Turkey’s 
refugee policy has in fact transformed. Drawing 
attention to the major humanitarian contribu-
tion made by Ankara towards helping Turkey’s 
Muslim neighbours fleeing a country devasted 
by war now no longer reinforces the govern-
ment’s position, in fact the reverse is true – the 
presence of millions of refugees is placing more 
and more strain on the government.
Casting off the refugee yoke
The presence of 3.6 million Syrians in Turkey is 
causing more and more domestic problems for 
the government. The most serious problem is, 
anti-Syrian resentments in society which also 
has repercussions for the popular view of the 
government’s refugee policy. A large portion 
of the Syrian community in Turkey has become 
ghettoised over the last seven years, often 
doing the worst paid jobs, and kept separate 
5 Almost since the agreement took effect, Ankara has 
been expressing its discontent due to expecting funds to 
be deposited into Turkish bank accounts. However, Brus-
sels releases the money to agencies carrying out specif-
ic projects in Turkey, such as activities of schools, and 
outlets providing medical, humanitarian or material aid. 
According to official EC figures, out of the agreed EUR 
6 billion in aid, by 30 September 2019 5.8 billion had 
been raised, 4.2 billion had been approved, and 2.57 
billion spent. See EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey. List 
of projects committed/decided, contracted, disbursed. 
Since the migration agreement with the 
EU was signed in March 2016, the number 
of Syrian refugees in Turkey has increased 
from more than 2.7 million to more than 
3.6 million, and Ankara’s policy towards 
them has changed.
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from the Turkish community.6 Although there 
are no collective empirical studies that show 
an increase in hostility towards refugees, there 
have been a series of examples indicating that 
this worrying trend exists. For example, the 
non-governmental organisation Change.org, 
which monitors xenophobic moods, says that 
since the war in Syria began, 73 spontaneous 
campaigns inciting hatred towards Syrians have 
been organised in Turkey, and were well re-
ceived on a large scale by users of social media.7 
There is a sharp contrast between this increase 
in hostility and the overall rhetoric used by the 
government and pro-government media up to 
now, showing Turkey’s exemplary fulfilment 
of the humanitarian obligation towards fellow 
Muslims.8 This argument, which is an element 
of the message that Turkey has the ‘moral ad-
vantage’ in relation to the West, has also im-
proved the country’s image in the Muslim world. 
At the moment, however, the refugee issue is 
beginning to cause the government more and 
more problems. The most important sign that 
the policy employed to date could backfire on 
the government was the repeated holding of 
the election for mayor of Istanbul in June 2019. 
The defeat of AKP candidate Binali Yıldırım was 
even more painful for the party due to its own 
electorate, often conservative and religious 
6 F. Çelik, ‘İzlenim: Türkiye’de Suriyeli mülteci olmak – 
Nefret söyleminin gölgesinde gettoya sıkışmak’, Medya-
scope, 15.07.2019. 
7 ‘Suriyelilere karşı nefret kampanyası’, „Gazete Duvar”, 
22.07.2019.
8 This rhetoric was particularly forceful when prime min-
ister Ahmeta Davutoğlu was in power (2014–2016) and 
reflected a particular kind of neo-ottoman paternalism 
towards the Arab population.
voters, switching to the opposition. The main 
reason often given for the support enjoyed by 
the opposition candidate is precisely a failure 
to solve the Syrian problem.9 Currently, approx-
imately 1 million Syrians live in Istanbul alone, 
of which half are officially registered.
The refugee question has also led to tension 
inside the government. For a long time, the 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is in 
an alliance with the ruling AKP, and has formed 
a parliamentary majority with that party, has 
been moderate in its declarations. For a num-
ber of weeks, the leader of the nationalists, 
Devlet Bahçeli, has been advocating sending 
Syrians back from Turkey as soon as possible, in 
response to the mood among his electorate.10 
This means that finding at least a partial solu-
tion to the refugee problem could be an issue 
on which the future rule of Erdoğan and of his 
party depends.
Safe zone in northern Syria
Given the growing tension at home, and the 
danger that maintaining the status quo as re-
gards refugees presents for the government, 
the authorities in Ankara have shown stiff de-
termination to find a solution not only to the 
migration problem, but also to a range of other 
problems related to the adverse consequences 
the war in Syria has had for Turkey.
Since the summer of 2019, Ankara has been 
taking an increasingly firm stand in its insist-
ence that a security zone needs to be created 
in northern Syria. Referred to by Turkish offi-
cials as the ‘safe zone’ or ‘peace corridor’, this 
zone is to be formed along the entire border 
and stretch 30 km inside Syria. It is presented as 
a place for relocation of Syrian refugees. 
9 ‘Seçim sonuçları: İstanbul Fatih’te AKP seçmeni İma-
moğlu’nun zaferi için ne diyor?’, BBC Türkçe, 24.06.2019. 
10 F.S. Yüksek, ‘Türkiye’de siyaseti kuşatan sorun: Suriyeli 
göçmenler’, Euronews, 13.09.2019. 
The refugee issue is becoming more and 
more problematic for the government. 
Approximately 1 million refugees current-
ly live in Istanbul alone, of which half are 
officially registered.
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From a political and military point of view, the 
zone is in fact designed to be a buffer between 
the southern border of Turkey and the Kurd-
ish parastate (the so-called Rojava), governed 
by the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Ankara 
sees this formation as a Syrian faction of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), with which Tur-
key has been at war for more than thirty years. 
By forcibly pursuing plans for the buffer zone, 
Ankara wishes to achieve a number of political 
goals at the same time – remove refugees from 
the country, guarantee their safety, and create 
a military border zone occupied by the loyal 
Arab population. The current refugees are Syr-
ian citizens of various origin, opposed to and 
persecuted by the Assad regime. The majority 
are Sunni Arabs (this group also includes Pal-
estinians and Syrian Turkmen and Kurds) who 
since the domestic conflict began have seen 
Turkey under AKP rule as cause for hope or 
treated it as a model for possible system trans-
formation in Syria.
Implementation of the plan for the security 
zone has de facto been in progress for several 
years in northern Syria, which is under direct 
Turkish control.11 Ankara intends to expand the 
zone to cover an area of 480 km east of the Eu-
phrates, under the control of the Syrian Kurds. 
This is a plan that is extremely hard for Turkey 
to achieve on its own. Even though the US has 
given consent for Turkish troops to enter Syria, 
they have opposition from Kurdish forces in this 
area to contend with (and this includes in two 
crucial urban centres of the parastate – Kobane 
and Kamışlı. The range of actions and theatre 
11 In the northern part of the de-escalation zone in Idlib 
and in Syrian border areas under Turkish control in oper-
ations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch.
of activity that the US has agreed to for Turkey 
under the agreement between the leaders of 
the two countries signed on 6 October is not 
clear either.
For Turkey, the proposed width of the zone is 
dictated by the range of its own artillery. This 
distance is intended to both protect the refu-
gees placed there, and protect Turkish territory 
itself against fire from Syria. The Turkish de-
fence minister said recently that military bases 
would have to be built in the buffer zone, simi-
lar to Turkish reinforced posts established in the 
Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq. 
Turkey intends to resettle approximately 1–3 
million Syrian refugees in the buffer zone, and 
build the appropriate infrastructure – accord-
ing to Turkish state television, the government 
is planning to spend as much as USD 27 billion 
on construction of new settlements.12 Exten-
sive interference in the ethnic make-up of the 
border zone would also be an element of the 
overall plan.13
Another factor leading Ankara to create the 
zone is the situation in the Syrian region of 
Idlib. Under the Astana agreements with Rus-
sia and Iran, Turkey is formally in control of this 
area as a ‘de-escalation zone’. This region is the 
last stronghold of the Syrian armed opposition, 
for which Turkey has acted as a patron since the 
war began. In practice, however, the activities 
of the Turkish forces in this area are paralysed, 
and the regime forces are making progress in 
regaining the territory. This area is inhabited 
by approximately 3.5 million people. If Bashar 
12 T. Gumrukcu, ‘Turkey not satisfied with talks with U.S. 
on Syria «safe zone»’, Reuters, 27.09.2019. 
13 According to current estimates, the 30-kilometre bor-
der zone, which stretches from the Euphrates to the Ti-
gris, which Turkey intends to take over, is inhabited by 
approximately 850 000 people – 650 000 Kurds (76%), 
180 000 Sunni Arabs (21%), 10 000 Turkmen (1%) and 
10 000 Christians (1%). Only one of the regions in the 
future zone (Tall Abyad) has an Arab majority. See 
M. Eisenstadt, S. Cagaptay, A Turkish ‘Safe Zone’ in Syr-
ia: Prospects and Policy Implications, Policywatch 3088, 
1.03.2019. For more information about migration and 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleansing and divisions 
in Syria in recent years, see F. Balanche, Sectarianism in 
Syria’s Civil War. A Geopolitical Study, The Washington 
Institute for Near East, 2018.
The Kurdish parastate in north-eastern 
Syria is an existential foe for Turkey, while 
it is an important ally to the US.
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al-Assad’s army is successful, most of these 
people will be potential new refugees. For this 
reason, in recent weeks, Erdoğan has presented 
plans for the security zone also as a potential 
place for evacuation of the civilian population 
from Idlib.
The most serious obstacle to achieving Turkey’s 
policy objectives is the lack of correlation be-
tween Turkey’s plans and the US’ plans, and 
their incompatibility. For Turkey, the Kurdish 
parastate in north-eastern Syria (like its head-
quarters in northern Iraq) is the existential foe, 
while for the US it is an important ally. Ignoring 
Turkey’s standpoint, and the struggle against 
the PKK, which Turkey considers its raison 
d’état, Washington is still looking for a modus 
vivendi between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds, 
and is also looking for a safe place for them 
in the political landscape in post-war Syria.
Prospects: new pressure on the EU
In recent weeks, the refugee issue in Turkey has 
become the greatest political burden since the 
war in Syria broke out. The gravity of the situation 
is illustrated by the government’s actions. The 
government plans to take an all-embracing ap-
proach to the problem, seeing the security zone 
as a solution to the threats caused by the con-
tinuing conflict beyond the country’s southern 
border. Creating the buffer zone could be very 
difficult, and will not necessarily lead to favour-
able results. Turkey will have to overcome oppo-
sition from Kurdish forces, and, even if it is suc-
cessful in doing so, constructing the zone could 
mean a series of lengthy, expensive, and contro- 
versial logistical projects to resettle refugees. 
Turkey’s actions in northern Syria will have 
a high political and financial cost, and for this 
reason Ankara will also expect support from 
the EU. This is how expressis verbis sugges-
tions, and a visible increase in illegal migration 
recorded on the Aegean Sea since the end of 
July14 should be interpreted. President Erdoğan 
has already threatened to stop honouring the 
2016 agreement, saying that Turkey does not 
have the resources to continue to care for ref-
ugees without the proper external support. 
At the same time, Greece has recorded the larg-
est collective inflow of people for three years, 
and the Greek foreign ministry, summoning the 
Turkish ambassador, suggested openly that de-
sisting from action on the part of Turkey made 
sense.15 It is highly likely therefore that in the 
coming months Turkey will make demands and 
threats and use other forms of pressure in re-
lations with the EU when seeking support for 
creation of the buffer zone.
14 In September, an increase of a few percent was record-
ed in the number of refugees coming to the Greek is-
lands. The overall trend is more important however. 
Greece is the EU country that took in the most migrants 
this year (in total 45 500, Italy 7 800 and Spain 22 900) 
and is continually dealing with the greatest pressure 
in this respect. Possible stimulation of migration on 
the Turkey-Greece route means significant pressure on 
the entire EU. Data for: Most common nationalities of 
Mediterranean sea and land arrivals from January 2019, 
The Refugees Operational Portal. 
15 Turkey has denied these allegations. See K. Tagaris, 
‘Greece sees first mass arrival of migrant boats in three 
years’, Reuters, 30.08.2019.
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